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Abstract. We will integrate in a single optimization problem a risk measure
beyond the variance and either arbitrage free real market quotations or nancial pricing
rules generated by an arbitrage free stochastic pricing model. A sequence of investment
strategies such that the couple (risk; price) diverges to ( 1; 1) will be called
good deal. We will see that good deals often exist in practice, and the paper main
objective will be to measure the good deal size. The provided good deal measures will
equal an optimal ratio between both risk and price, and there will exist alternative
interpretations of these measures. They will also provide the minimum relative (per
dollar) price modication that prevents the good deal existence. Moreover, they will
be a crucial instrument to detect those securities or marketed claims which are over
or under-priced. Many classical actuarial and nancial optimization problems may
generate wrong solutions if the used market quotations or stochastic pricing models
do not prevent the good deal existence. This fact will be illustrated in the paper,
and it will be pointed out how the provided good deal measurement may be useful to
overcome this caveat. Numerical experiments will be yielded as well.
1 Introduction
The use of risk functions beyond the variance is becoming more and more fre-
quent in both actuarial and nancial studies. Nevertheless, when the most
important arbitrage free pricing models of nancial economics (binomial, tri-
nomial, Black and Scholes, stochastic volatility, etc.) and the most important
risk functions (V aR, CV aR, weighted CV aR, robust CV aR, spectral mea-
sures, etc.) are combined in a single problem, one often faces the existence of
sequences of investment strategies (good deals, or GD) whose pair (risk; price)
diverges to ( 1; 1). This pathological nding has been analyzed in Balbás
et al. (2016a), where explicit examples of the sequences above have been con-
structed and their performance empirically tested. The main conclusion was
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that the divergence to ( 1; 1) is more theoretical than real, but the per-
formance of the constructed GD was good enough. The GD were collections
of options providing much better realized Sharpe ratios than their underlying
assets.
In this paper we will deal with a couple (;) composed of the risk function
 and the pricing rule . (;) will be called non compatible if it and only if
implies the GD existence, and the main objective will be the measurement of
the GD size, denoted by ~N or ~N (;). An important precedent in nancial
theory is the notion of arbitrage. Though the absence of arbitrage always holds
in theoretical approaches, real market quotations sometimes reect the existence
of arbitrage. For this reason some years ago many authors gave several measures
of the arbitrage size. This allowed them to address interesting questions such as
pricing and hedging issues under transaction costs, cross-market arbitrage, in-
tegration between markets, trading systems, valuation of embedded derivatives,
etc. Similarly, the existence of GD (or the lack of compatibility) must be now
measured, because in some sense it is indicating a huge lack of balance between
the risk that the investor is facing and the wealth that he/she is expecting. As
we will see, these unbalanced situations may lead to wrong decisions in several
elds. For instance, managers could pay expensive prices or compose ine¢ cient
portfolios, and insurers could buy non-optimal reinsurance contracts or receive
too cheap premiums.
The arbitrage measurement was addressed from several perspectives. One
of them was related to the capital prots generated by an arbitrage strategy
(Balbás et al., 1999). Nevertheless, if the arbitrage strategy can be repeated
once and once again, the arbitrage prot will be multiplied once and once again
too, and therefore it will become innity. To prevent this caveat Balbás et
al. ( 1999) measured the arbitrage level as the maximum ratio between the
arbitrage income and the value of the sold assets, i:e:, these authors gave a
relative measure of the arbitrage degree. Similarly, when (risk; price) diverges
to ( 1; 1) we will need to maximize ratios risk=price. Otherwise we will be
facing unbounded optimization problems.
A risk=price ratio will be an objective function which will not satisfy many
desirable analytical properties (continuity, convexity, di¤erentiability, etc.), and
therefore its optimization will become less complex if one deals with vector
optimization problems involving both risk and price. Since Harry Markowitz
published his seminal results, it is known that multiobjective analyses are use-
ful in many nancial topics. In particular, in portfolio selection one has sev-
eral interesting approaches such as Ballestero and Romero (1996), Ballestero
et al. ( 2012), Dash and Kajiji (2014), etc. With respect to the simultaneous
optimization of both risk and price, we will apply well-known results and will
optimize riskunder constraints for price(Sawaragi et al., 1985).
The paper outline is as follows. Section 2 will be devoted to xing nota-
tions and assumptions. The measure ~N (;) will be constructed in Section 3.
The rst approach will apply when one does not consider any theoretical pric-
ing model, and only a nite collection of available securities and their market
quotations are involved. The advantage of this approach is clear, since it is suf-
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cient to choose a robust (or ambiguous) risk function  and the value of ~N will
become model-independent. Beyond the optimal risk=price ratio, there will be
a second (or dual) interpretation of ~N which must be highlighted. ~N coincides
with the minimum relative (per dollar) price modication leading to a GD free
market. Moreover, the dual approach will permit the investor to identify the
over-priced securities (to be sold so as to create a GD) and the under-priced
ones (to be bought). After modifying the prices according to the value of ~N ,
the GD absence will be guaranteed. A numerical example will illustrate all the
theoretical ndings. In particular, it will show how easily the GD arises in real
markets, how to implement the GD, and how the prices must be modied.
The second approach replaces real market quotations with pricing rules gen-
erated by a complete and arbitrage free stochastic pricing model. Completeness
may be relaxed, as will be indicated too. Both the primal (optimal risk=price
ratios) and the dual (minimum relative price modications) interpretations
of ~N will apply again, but important di¤erences with respect to the model-
independent approach will be also found. Indeed, if the stochastic discount
factor (SDF , also called pricing kernel, Du¢ e, 1988) of the pricing rule  is not
essentially bounded, and the sub-gradient of the risk function  is composed of
essentially bounded random variables, then the existence of GD is guaranteed,
and the value of ~N (;) will be strictly higher than one. In other words, some
priced-one marketed claims have a current price which should be modied more
than 100%. Otherwise the lack of compatibility will remain true. This seems to
be an important nding because it is reecting that some marketed claims will
be impossible to price correctly with the standard pricing methods. This could
explain some empirical caveats a¤ecting the price of several securities, including
vanilla options (Bondarenko, 2014). As in the model-independent case, we will
analyze some important examples. In particular, we will present a complete
analysis involving the Black and Scholes model and the CV aR.
The presence of GD may provoke irrational solutions in many classical prob-
lems involving prices and risk functions. Section 4 will be devoted to illustrating
it with some particular actuarial examples (optimal reinsurance, premium cal-
culation, etc.) and some nancial examples (asset allocation, risk management,
etc.). This section is merely illustrative, so we will not fully address the solution
of the presented caveats. The dimension of the paper would become enormous.
Beyond the presented examples, the ~N measure could apply to address the top-
ics years ago studied by means of the arbitrage measurement, such as market
integration, valuation of embedded options, trading systems, etc. Therefore, the
GD size measurement may open new research lines in nance, insurance, and
those elds related to prices and risks.
The last section presents the main conclusions of the paper.
2 Preliminaries and Notations
Consider the probability space (
;F ; IP) composed of the set of states of the
world
, the  algebra F and the probability measure IP. Denote by IE (y)
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the mathematical expectation of every IR valued random variable y dened
on 
. Denote by L2 the Hilbert space of random variables y on 
 such that
IE
 
y2

<1, endowed with the inner product (x; y)! IE (xy) and norm kyk2 = 
IE
 
y2
1=2
. Let [0; T ] be a time interval. From an intuitive point of view, one
can interpret that y 2 L2 represents the portfolio pay-o¤ at T for some arbitrary
investor (nance), or claims within [0; T ] for some arbitrary insurer (insurance).
Throughout this paper y will represent the random wealth at T , although other
interpretations would not modify our main conclusions. If  : L2  ! IR is a
risk measure then  (y) may be understood as the risk associated with the
wealth y. Let us assume that  satises a representation theorem in the line of
Artzner et al. (1999) or Rockafellar et al. (2006). More precisely, consider the
sub-gradient of 
 =

z 2 L2; IE (yz)   (y) ;8y 2 L2	  L2 (1)
composed of those linear expressions lower than .  will be convex and
weakly compact (Schae¤er, 1970) and  will be its envelope, in the sense that
 (y) = Max f IE (yz) ; z 2 g (2)
will hold for every y 2 L2. Furthermore, we will also assume that
f1g   

z 2 L2; IE (z) = 1	 (3)
and
 

z 2 L2; IP (z  0) = 1	 : (4)
These assumptions are equivalent to the usual properties of norm-continuity,
sub-additivity, homogeneity, mean dominance, translation invariance and monotonic-
ity. To sum up, we have:
Assumption 1  : L2  ! IR is norm-continuous, sub-additive (  (y1 + y2) 
 (y1) +  (y2) if y1; y2 2 L2), homogeneous (  (y) =  (y) if y 2 L2 and
  0), mean dominating (  (y)   IE (y) if y 2 L2), translation invariant
(  (y + k) =  (y)   k if y 2 L2 and k 2 IR) and decreasing (  (y1)   (y2) if
y1; y2 2 L2 and IP (y1   y2  0) = 1). 
Consider a closed sub-space Y  L2 of reachable pay-o¤s. There are many
cases included. For instance, we can consider that there exists a set T  [0; T ]
of trading dates, a ltration (Ft)t2T such that F0 = f?;
g and FT = F , and a
IRm+1 valued adapted price process S = (S0; S1; :::; Sm) such that every y 2 Y
is a marketed claim (or a nal wealth replicated by means of a self-nancing
portfolio adapted to the ltration). As a second example, we can deal with
a static approach such that T = f0; Tg and Y is a nite-dimensional space
generated by m + 1 securities fS0; S1; :::; Smg  L2 available in the market.
Consider also a linear and continuous pricing rule  : Y  ! IR providing us
with the price  (y) of every y 2 Y at t = 0. Under the rst framework above
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 (y) will coincide with the initial price of the self-nancing portfolio leading to
the pay-o¤ y (notice that the absence of arbitrage implies that two adapted and
self-nancing portfolios leading to the same pay-o¤ will have the same initial
price). Under the second framework we can consider that  (y) is just a trivial
linear expression of the initial prices of the available assets. We will assume the
existence of a riskless asset (1 2 Y ) and a null interest rate, i:e:,
 (1) = 1: (5)
Obviously, these assumptions are not at all restrictive. In particular, (5) can be
easily achieved by the usual normalization method.
Bearing in mind the properties of  (Assumption 1) and , the proof of
Proposition 1 below becomes trivial.
Proposition 1 The following statements are equivalent;
a) There exists a sequence (yn)
1
n=1  Y such that  (yn)  0, n = 1; 2; :::
and Limn!1 (yn) =  1.
b) For every a 2 IR there exists a sequence (yn)1n=1  Y such that  (yn)  a,
n = 1; 2; ::: and Limn!1 (yn) =  1.
c) There exists a sequence (yn)
1
n=1  Y such that  (yn)  0, n = 1; 2; :::
and Limn!1 (yn) =  1.
d) For every a 2 IR there exists a sequence (yn)1n=1  Y such that  (yn)  a,
n = 1; 2; ::: and Limn!1 (yn) =  1.
e) There exists a sequence (yn)
1
n=1  Y such that Limn!1 (yn) =  1 and
Limn!1 (yn) =  1.. 
Let us introduce the notion of compatibilityof Balbás and Balbás (2009).
Denition 2 The couple (;) will be said to be non-compatible if a), b), c),
d) or e) above hold. 
Remark 3 Suppose that (;) is non-compatible. Consider the sequence
(yn)
1
n=1  Y
of Proposition 1a. The price of the sequence (yn   (yn) + 1)1n=1 remains equal
to one (see (5)), i:e:,
 (yn   (yn) + 1) = 1; n = 1; 2; ::: (6)
The risk function satises (see Assumption 1)
 (yn   (yn) + 1) =  (yn) +  (yn)  1   (yn)!  1: (7)
Bearing in mind that  is mean-dominating, the expected value of yn  (yn)+1
satises
IE (yn   (yn) + 1)    (yn   (yn) + 1)! +1: (8)
Combining (6), (7) and (8) we have a sequence of investment strategies whose
risk goes to minus innity while its expected return goes to plus innity. 
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The pathologypresented in Remark 3 is not at all strange in asset pric-
ing. As illustrated by Balbás et al. (2016a), the most important arbitrage-free
pricing models (Black and Scholes, Heston, etc.) reect this anti-intuitive be-
havior when combined with the most important coherent risk measures (CV aR,
weighted CV aR, etc.) or the V aR risk measure (despite the fact that the V aR
does not satisfy Assumption 1). Furthermore, this caveat may also arise if one
incorporates ambiguity to the pricing model (i:e:, IP is not perfectly known) and
deals with robust risk measures (Balbás et al., 2016b). Henceforth, strategies
reecting the pathology above will be called good deals in this paper.
Denition 4 The sequence (yn)
1
n=1  Y is said to be a GD if8<:  (yn) = 1; n = 1; 2; :::IE (yn)! +1
 (yn)!  1
(9)
hold. 
Remark 5 Bearing in mind Remark 3, it is obvious that (;) is compatible
if and only if there is no GD. 
3 Measuring the good deal size
A critical assumption in nancial theory is the absence of arbitrage in real
markets and asset pricing models. Since real market data sometimes reect
the existence of arbitrage, a major topic in nance was the measurement of
the arbitrage size (Prisman, 1986, Davis et al., 1993, Kamara and Miller, 1995,
Chen and Knez, 1995, Kempf and Korn, 1998, etc.). This allowed the authors
to address several interesting questions such as pricing and hedging issues under
transaction costs, cross-market arbitrage, integration between markets, trading
systems, etc. Similarly, the existence of GD (or the lack of compatibility) must
be measured, because in some sense it is indicating a lack of balance between
the risk that the investor is facing and the wealth that he/she is expecting. As
we will see, these unbalanced situations may lead to wrong decisions in several
elds. For instance, investors could pay expensive prices or compose ine¢ cient
portfolios, and insurers could buy non-optimal reinsurance contracts or receive
too cheap premiums.
If we focus again on the arbitrage measurement, we will conclude that there
were di¤erent approaches. Some of them were related to the fundamental the-
orems of asset pricing (Chen and Knez, 1995), others were justied by means
of micro-structure models (Kempf and Korn, 1998), etc. The methodology of
Balbás et al. (1999) and (2000) was related to the prots generated by the arbi-
trageur. We will be inspired by this approach in order to measure the GD size,
since it will enable us to measure in monetary terms.
If an arbitrage strategy is available and we do not impose any constraint,
then it is easy to prove that the absolute available arbitrage prot becomes
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unbounded. For that reason Balbás et al. (1999) measured in relative terms, or
by mean of ratios. This caveat also applies when measuring theGD size. Indeed,
Proposition 1 shows that for negative prices one can construct strategies whose
risk goes to minus innity (Proposition 1a), while for negative risks one can
obtain innite prots(Proposition 1c). Hence, we will give relative measures
as well. More accurately, we will measure with respect to the market value of
the sold assets or, equivalently, we will impose a short position lower than one
dollar.
Remark 6 Since both  and  are positively homogeneous, the existence of a
strategy y 2 Y such that  (y)  0 and  (y) < 0 will imply that  (y)  0 and
Lim!+1 (ay) =  1, and the caveat of Proposition 1a will hold. Therefore,
the fulllment of the implication
y 2 Y;  (y)  0 =)   (y)  0 (10)
is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to prevent the existence of GD. 
3.1 Market data linked measures
In the rst approach we will consider a nite set of available securities
fS0; S1; :::; Smg  L2;
S0 = 1 denoting the riskless asset. We will assume that fS0; S1; :::; Smg are
linearly independent,1 and their current prices p0 = 1; p1; :::; pm are observable
in the market. In order to prevent some mathematical problems, along with
Assumption 1, in Section 3:1 we will impose Assumption 2 below;
Assumption 2 IP (Sj  0) = 1, j = 1; 2; :::;m. Consequently, the absence
of arbitrage implies that pj > 0, j = 1; 2; :::;m. 
The closed sub-space Y  L2 will be the linear manifold generated by the
m+ 1 available assets, and the pricing rule  will be the obvious one,

0@ mX
j=0
yjSj
1A = mX
j=0
yjpj : (11)
Our measure ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

of the GD size will be the optimal value
of the optimization problem
Max  
0@ mX
j=0
(xj   yj)Sj
1A
8>>>><>>>>:
Pm
j=0 pjyj  1Pm
j=0 (xj   yj) pj  0
xj ; yj  0; j = 0; 1; :::;m
(12)
1 i:e:, there are no non-trivial linear combinations leading to the null asset, or, equivalently,
the range of the covariance matrix of fS1; S2; :::; Smg equals m.
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
(xj)
m
j=0 ; (yj)
m
j=0

2 IRm+1IRm+1 being the decision variable. The interpreta-
tion of (12) is as follows. Every portfolio x   y = (xj   yj)mj=0 is represented
by the vector of purchases x = (xj)
m
j=0 and the vector of sales y = (yj)
m
j=0.
The rst constraint imposes a short position lower than one dollar (as justied
above) and the second one imposes a non-positive global price. Thus, if the
desired implication (10) held, then the objective function could not be positive,
and the objective maximum value would be reached at x = y = 0 and would
equal ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

= 0. The failure of (10) would lead to a positive
value of ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

. More accurately, we have;
Proposition 7 Problem (12) is bounded and solvable, with an optimal value
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

 0. Furthermore, (;) is compatible (or GD free,
Remark 5) if and only if ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

= 0.
Proof. The objective function is obviously continuous (see Assumption 1) and
the feasible set is obviously bounded (and therefore compact) because every pj
is positive. Hence, (12) is solvable due to the Weierstrass Theorem. Since
x = y = 0 satises the problem constraints and  (0) = 0, the inequality
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

 0 becomes obvious.
Suppose that ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

> 0. Then, the solution (x; y) of
(12) satises

0@ mX
j=0
 
xj   yj

Sj
1A < 0
and
Pm
j=0
 
xj   yj

pj  0, the implication (10) does not hold, and Remark 6
implies that there is GD. Conversely, suppose that ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

= 0
and let us see that (10) will hold. If (10) failed then we could take y 2 Y with
 (y)  0 and   (y) > 0. y is a linear combination of fS0; S1; :::; Smg so
y =
mX
j=0
(xj   yj)Sj
for some xj ; yj  0, j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m. If
Pm
j=0 pjyj  1 then
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

   (y) > 0
and we have a contradiction. If
Pm
j=0 pjyj > 1 then we could take x
0
j =
xj=(
Pm
j=0 pjyj) and y
0
j = yj=(
Pm
j=0 pjyj), and we would have the same con-
tradiction because  is positively homogeneous. 
Problem (12) is concave. Bearing in mind Assumption 1, (1), (2), (3) and
(4), and proceeding as in Balbás and Balbás (2009) or Balbás et al. (2010), one
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can prove the existence of a linear dual problem characterizing the solutions of
(12). Hence, let us present the result below whose proof will be omitted because
similar ones are available in the cited reference.
Theorem 8 Consider Problem
Min 
8<: pj  IE (Sjz)  0; j = 0; 1; :::;mpj (  )  IE (Sjz)  0; j = 0; 1; :::;m
  0;   0; z 2 
(13)
(; ; z) 2 IR IR L2 being the decision variable.
a) Problem (13) is bounded and solvable, and the optimal values of (12) and
(13) coincide.
b) Suppose that (x; y) is (12)-feasible and (; ; z) is (13)-feasible. Then,
(x; y) solves (12) and (; ; z) solves (13) if and only if the complementary
slackness conditions below8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Pm
j=0
 
xj   yj

IE (Sjz) 
Pm
j=0
 
xj   yj

IE (Sjz
) ; 8z 2 


1 Pmj=0 pjyj = 0

Pm
j=0
 
xj   yj

pj

= 0
xj (pj
   IE (Sjz)) = 0; j = 0; 1; :::;m
yj (IE (Sjz
)  (   ) pj) = 0; j = 0; 1; :::;m
(14)
hold. .
Corollary 9 Consider Problem
Min 
8<:     IE

Sj
pj
z

 ; j = 0; 1; :::;m
0      1; 1  ; z 2 
(15)
a) Problem (15) is bounded and solvable, and the optimal values of (12) and
(15) coincide.
b) Suppose that (x; y) is (12)-feasible and (; ; z) is (15)-feasible. Then,
(x; y) solves (12) and (; ; z) solves (15) if and only if the complementary
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slackness conditions below8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Pm
j=0
 
xj   yj

IE (Sjz) 
Pm
j=0
 
xj   yj

IE (Sjz
) ; 8z 2 


1 Pmj=0 pjyj = 0Pm
j=0 pjx

j =
Pm
j=0 pjy

j
xj

   IE

Sj
pj
z

= 0; j = 0; 1; :::;m
yj

IE

Sj
pj
z

  (   )

= 0; j = 0; 1; :::;m
(16)
hold.
Proof. Indeed, if (; ; z) is (13)-feasible and  >  then (; ; z) is feasible too
(see (4)) and the objective function decreases, so the constraint     0 will
not be at all restrictive. Besides, (3) along with the rst constraint of (13) for
j = 0 trivially lead to   1. Moreover, (3) along with the second constraint of
(13) for j = 0 trivially lead to      1. Lastly,   1 implies that the third
condition in (14) is equivalent to the third one in (16). 
Corollary 10 (;) is compatible if and only if there exists z 2  such that
IE

Sj
pj
z

= 1, j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m.
Proof. Indeed, If (;) is compatible then Proposition 7 shows that the solution
(; ; z) of (15) satises  = 0. Thus, the constraints of (15) imply that
IE

Sj
pj
z

= , j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m. In particular, for j = 0 we have (see (3))
1 = IE (z) = .
Conversely, suppose that the existence of z 2  holds. Then, take (x; y) =
(0; 0) and (; ; z) = (0; 1; z), and it is easy to verify that they are feasible
and satisfy (16), so the optimal value of (15) will become
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

=  = 0;
and Proposition 7 shows that (;) is compatible. 
If (;) is not compatible one could try to modify (pj)
m
j=0 so as to recover
compatibility. According to the latter corollary, if (; ; z) is the solution of
(15), pj = IE (Sjz
), j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m could be a good alternative. Next, let us
show that, in some sense, this is the best alternative, since it minimizes the
maximum relative (or per dollar) price modication.
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Corollary 11 Consider a dual solution (; ; z) and take pj = IE (Sjz
),
j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m. Suppose that
pj > 0; j = 0; 1; :::;m:
2 (17)
Then;
a) p0 = 1, and the riskless rate remains the same if
 
pj
m
j=0
replaces (pj)
m
j=0.
b) ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ;
 
pj
m
j=0

= 0. Moreover, if replaces  and
 
pj
m
j=0
replaces (pj)
m
j=0 in (11), we will have that (;
) is compatible.
c)
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

= Max

pj
pj
  p

i
pi
; i; j = 0; 1; :::;m

: (18)
In particular,
 
pj
m
j=0
= (pj)
m
j=0 if and only if (;) is compatible.
d) Consider an arbitrary
 
pj
m
j=0
2 IRm+1. If p0 = 1, pj > 0, j =
0; 1; :::;m, and ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ;
 
pj
m
j=0

= 0 , then
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

Max

pj
pj
  p

i
pi
; i; j = 0; 1; :::;m

:
Proof. a) It trivially follows from (3).
b) It trivially follows from Corollary 10.
c) As in the proof of Corollary 10, if ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

= 0 then pj =
IE (Sjz
) = pj , j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m, and therefore the right hand side of (18) equals
zero too. Suppose that ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

> 0. Consider the solutions
(x; y) and (; ; z) of (12) and (15). Obviously, (x; y) 6= (0; 0), and the
second and third conditions of (16) imply that x 6= 0 and y 6= 0. If xj1 > 0
and yj2 > 0 then (16) implies that
IE

Sj1
pj1
z

= ; IE

Sj2
pj2
z

= (   ) :
Hence,
pj1
pj1
  p

j2
pj2
=    (   ) = :
For an arbitrary couple (i; j), and bearing in mind the constraints of (15), we
have that
pj
pj
  p

i
pi
    (   ) = :
2 (17) will hold if IP (z > 0) = 1. Analogously, if Assumption 2 is replaced by the stronger
property IP (Sj > 0) = 1, j = 1; 2; :::;m, then (17) will hold because IP (z  0) = 1 due to (4)
and z 6= 0 due to (3). Lastly, bearing in mind the constraints of (15), (17) will also hold if
    > 0.
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Thus, the right hand side of (18) equals . Hence the result becomes obvious
because ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

=  owing to Corollary 9a.
d) Corollary 10 implies the existence of z 2  such that pj = IE (Sjz),
j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m. It is obvious that
 = Max

IE

Sj
pj
z

; j = 0; 1; :::;m

= Max

pj
pj
; j = 0; 1; :::;m

    = Min

IE

Sj
pj
z

; j = 0; 1; :::;m

= Min

pj
pj
; j = 0; 1; :::;m

make (; ; z) (15)-feasible. Therefore, ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

=  
 =    (   ), i:e:,
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0


Max

pj
pj
; j = 0; 1; :::;m

 Min

pj
pj
; j = 0; 1; :::;m

= Max

pj
pj
  p

i
pi
; i; j = 0; 1; :::;m

:

Remark 12 Corollary 11 may be interpreted in terms of fair prices. Indeed,
denote by (; ; z) a solution of (15). If (;) is non compatible then one
can build portfolios with negative risk and zero or negative price (Proposition
1). According to (16), this is possible if one properly buys those securities such
that IE

Sj
pj
z

=  and sells those ones satisfying IE

Sj
pj
z

=    . In
other words, according to the risk measure , if IE

Sj
pj
z

=  (IE

Sj
pj
z

=
   ) then Sj is under-priced (over-priced), and, according to Corollary 11,
the new prices pj = IE (Sjz
), j = 0; 1; 2; :::;m will provide us with the lowest
relative modication leading to fair prices (or GD free prices). Notice that
pj = IE (Sjz
) = pj  pj if xj > 0 (pj = IE (Sjz) = (   ) pj  pj if
yj > 0). 
3.2 Numerical experiment
Let us illustrate the results of Section 3:1 with a very simple example. We will
deal an arbitrage free and almost model-independent option market, and will
see that some premiums must decrease more than 0:4% in order to prevent the
GD existence. Furthermore, the GD will be static, which means that once it
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is implemented, the portfolio does not have to be rebalanced before the options
maturity.3
As above, suppose that S0 = 1 is a riskless asset and consider a security S1
whose behavior is given by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with a current
price, drift and volatility equaling 1, 1% and 60%, respectively. Consider also a
derivative market where European calls can be traded. The unique maturity is
1=4 years (three months), and the available strikes are f0:82; 0:84; 0:86; :::; 1:4g,
i:e:, the lowest one equals 0:82, the highest one equals 1:4, and the increment
between two consecutive strikes equals 0:02. Globally, there are 32 available se-
curities (the riskless asset, the underlying asset and 30 European calls). Suppose
that the data perfectly t the Black and Scholes model, i:e:, all of the market
prices equal the theoretical ones given by the Black and Scholes formula. Ac-
cordingly, they become0BBBBBB@
0:221151109; 0:207527141; 0:194479893; 0:182013559; 0:170128799
0:158822968; 0:14809037; 0:137922549; 0:12830858; 0:119235385
0:110688033; 0:102650044; 0:095103673; 0:088030189; 0:08141012
0:075223495; 0:069450051; 0:064069422; 0:059061311; 0:054405635
0:050082646; 0:046073045; 0:042358062; 0:038919533; 0:035739953
0:032802518; 0:030091156; 0:027590546; 0:025286127; 0:023164098
1CCCCCCA
Obviously, since the Black and Scholes model is arbitrage free, this market is
arbitrage free as well. Consider an investor who is also interested in verify-
ing the compatibility between prices above and the CV aR risk measure, 
being the level of condence. Suppose that  = 79%. Despite the fact that
this investor can verify that the quotations above lead to a constant implied
volatility  = 0:6, and therefore the data conrm in this case the Black and
Scholes model, let us assume that he/she is still very ambiguous with respect to
that. Accordingly, he/she will accept deviations between the predictions of the
log-normal distribution and the realized value of S1 in three months. He/she
considers that the error between the probabilities of the log-normal distribution
and the real probabilities may become 100%. In other words, for every Borel
subset B  IR, the real probability of the event S1 2 B will be laying within the
spread [0; 2IP (S1 2 B)], where IP (S1 2 B) is the theoretical probability under
log-normality. In such a case, instead the CV aR79% risk measure, the investor
will use the robust CV aR79% (RCV aR79%). In general,
RCV aR (y) := Max

CV aR(Q;) (y) ; 0  dQ
dIP
 2

; (19)
where Q is a IP continuous probability measure and CV aR(Q;) (y) is the
CV aR of y under Q. Balbás et al. (2016b) have shown that the RCV aR (y)
3According to the empirical evidence, the available theoretical arbitrage free pricing models
have many problems to match real market prices in active and liquid derivative markets
(Bondarenko, 2014). Perhaps, the theoretical models should prevent the existence of GD as
well.
13
above is well dened for every y 2 L2, along with the fulllment of Assumption
1. Moreover the sub-gradient (1) is given by
z 2 L2; 0  dQ
dIP
 2; 0  z  1
1  

dQ
dIP

; IE (z) = 1

: (20)
It is easy to see that the set above coincides with8><>:
n
z 2 L2; 0  z  21  ; IE (z) = 1
o
=n
z 2 L2; 0  z  11 (1+)=2 ; IE (z) = 1
o
:
(21)
Since this is the sub-gradient of the CV aR(1+)=2 risk measure (Rockafellar
et al., 2006), RCV aR = CV aR(1+)=2 and the high ambiguity level of this
example only implies that the level of condence must properly increase. In
particular, for  = 79% one has (1 + ) =2 = 89:5%, and our investor will verify
the compatibility between the given market and the CV aR89:5% risk measure.
Though the existence of ambiguity only implies a larger level of condence,
it is important to point out that we are dealing with an ambiguous setting.
Expression (19) implies a worst case approach, and therefore if Implication
(10) fails for the given market and RCV aR79% = CV aR89:5% (and therefore a
GD exists, Remark 6), it will fail for every CV aR(Q;79%), and Q does not have
to be known. In this sense, the GD existence is model-independent, and will
also hold for models beyond the Black and Scholes one.
In order to verify the existence of GD, we can solve the linear Problem (15),
with  given by (21) for  = 79% (see Anderson and Nash, 1987). The optimal
value becomes
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

= 0:004203112  0:42% (22)
and the existence of GD (or the lack of compatibility, Remark 5) is implied by
Proposition 7.
Once the lack of compatibility was conrmed, (16) will enable us to give an
explicit GD and the list of under-priced (over-priced) securities. In fact, it is
easy to check the fulllment of the information below;0BBBBBBBBBB@
Assets_Sold_by_the_GD
Call_Strike_0:96
Call_Strike_1:16
Call_Strike_1:3
Call_Strike_1:36
1CCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
Assets_Bought_by_the_GD
Riskless_Asset
Call_Strike_1
Call_Strike_1:06
Call_Strike_1:2
Call_Strike_1:28
Call_Strike_1:34
Call_Strike_1:38
Call_Strike_1:4
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
Accordingly, and bearing in mind that every modication of prices preventing
the GD existence will conserve the same riskless rate (Corollary 11), the over-
priced securities are is the European calls with strikes 0:96, 1:16, 1:3 and 1:36,
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while the calls of strikes 1, 1:06, 1:2, 1:28, 1:34, 1:38 and 1:4 are under-priced
(Remark 12). The solution of (15) gives  = 1 and     = 0:995796888, so
(16), Corollary 11 and Remark 12 allow us to implement the minimum relative
modication of prices preventing the GD existence. The price of the seven
under-priced calls should remain the same ( = 1), while the price of the four
over-priced calls should be multiplied by 0:9958 (     0:9958). Thus, in
this example ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

gives the relative price variation of the
expensive assets (see (22)). Once z is known, the rest of prices should decrease
according to the results of Corollary 11. We will not address this straightforward
modication in order to shorten the exposition.4
3.3 Pricing model linked measures
The approach of Section 3:1 has interesting advantages because it applies for
real market data and one does not have to impose any assumption beyond the
absence of arbitrage. Nevertheless, there are also some drawbacks, since it does
not apply for general pricing models. In order to overcome them, we will provide
a new GD measure for complete pricing models, i:e:, cases such that Y = L2.
Interesting examples are, among others, the binomial model and the Black and
Scholes model. If the model is incomplete we can often assume that there is
an extension of  to the whole space L2 which still prevents the absence of
arbitrage. This extension, still denoted by , implies that this incomplete case
also ts in our general framework. The existence of the extension holds, for
instance, if the set 
 only contains nitely many states (Harrison and Kreps,
1979). Therefore, cases such as the usual trinomial models are also included
in or analysis. If 
 contains innitely many states then the existence of  is
also possible. For instance, though formally stochastic volatility models are
incomplete, in practice it is assumed the existence of volatility dependent assets
making them complete. Otherwise it would be impossible to use these models
4The dual solution z is an exotic derivative of S1, namely,
z =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
9:523809524; 0:732390081 < S1 < 0:756345122
9:523809524; 0:771634941 < S1 < 0:786508847
9:523809524; 0:947638208 < S1 < 0:962000836
6:0890897; 1:006619358 < S1 < 1:022152267
9:523809524; 1:071497097 < S1 < 1:089092088
1:228932079; 1:089092088 < S1 < 1:107403466
9:091953283; 1:157082562 < S1 < 1:178912787
5:882406772; 1:227117704 < S1 < 1:25412988
3:889725707; 1:316447058 < S1 < 1:353379522
2:694707294; 1:373837141 < S1 < 1:420023944
2:634172493; 1:420023944 < S1 < 1:446520681
2:732181867; 1:446520681 < S1 < 1:509427691
0:923565011; 1:509427691 < S1 < 1:54799097
2:472733554; 1:54799097 < S1 < 1:593797149
5:22380624; 1:593797149 < S1 < 1:650491631
5:386339925; 1:837722647 < S1 < 2:085596933
0; Otherwise
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so as to give a unique price of the usual derivatives. Further details about
the existence of  under general conditions for 
 may be found in Luenberger
(2001).
The Riesz representation theorem (Schae¤er, 1970) implies the existence of
a unique z 2 L2 such that
 (y) = IE (yz) (23)
holds for every y 2 L2. z is usually called SDF , and it must satisfy
IP (z > 0) = 1 (24)
in order to prevent the arbitrage (Du¢ e,1988). Furthermore, (23) and (5) triv-
ially imply that
IE (z) = 1: (25)
In order to prevent some mathematical problems, along with Assumption 1,
in Sections 3:3 and 3:4 we will impose Assumption 3 below;
Assumption 3 There exists (; z) 2 IR such that IP (z  z) = 1. 
The new measure ~N (;) of the GD size will be the optimal value of the
optimization problem
Max    (x  y)
8<:  (y)  1 (x  y)  0
x; y 2 L2; x; y  0
(26)
Obviously, (26) is always feasible and ~N (;)  0 because (x; y) = (0; 0)
satises the required constraints. Next, let us give a main result whose proof is
similar to those of Theorem 8 and Corollary 9.
Theorem 13 Consider Problem
Min 

(  ) z  z  z
0      1; 1  ; z 2  (27)
(; ; z) 2 IR IR L2 being the decision variable.
a) Problem (27) is feasible, and the optimal values of (26) and (27) coincide.
b) Suppose that (x; y) is (26)-feasible and (; ; z) is (27)-feasible. Then,
(x; y) solves (26) and (; ; z) solves (27) if and only if the complementary
slackness conditions below8>>>><>>>>:
IE ((x   y) z)  IE ((x   y) z) ; 8z 2 
 (1  IE (yz)) = 0
IE ((x   y) z) = 0
x (z   z) = 0
y (z   (   ) z) = 0
(28)
hold. 
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Corollary 14 The statements below are equivalent;
a) (;) is compatible.
b) ~N (;) = 0.
c) (x; y) = (0; 0) solves (26).
d) The solution (; ; z) of (27) satises  = 0.
e) The solution (; ; z) of (27) satises  = 1.
f) The solution (; ; z) of (27) satises z = z.
Proof. a) ) b) If (;) is compatible then Implication (10) holds. Thus, if
(x; y) is (26)-feasible the second problem constraint implies that   (x  y)  0.
Since (0; 0) is (26)-feasible, b) becomes obvious.
b)) c) (0; 0) is (26)-feasible, and   (0)  0, so (0; 0) solves (26) when the
optimal objective equals 0.
c) ) d) If (x; y) = (0; 0) solves (26) then the optimal value of (27) will
vanish.
d) ) e) If the optimal value of (27) vanishes, then the rst constraint will
lead to z = z. Taking expectations, and bearing in mind (3) and (25), we
have that  = 1.
e) ) f) If  = 1, then the rst constraint of (27) implies that z  z.
Since both random variables have the same expectation (see (3) and (25)), we
have that z = z.
f)) a) Suppose that z = z. It is very easy to verify that (x; y) = (0; 0)
and (; ; z) = (0; 1; z) are feasible and satisfy (28). If (x; y) = (0; 0)
solves (26), then (10) must hold, and therefore (;) must be compatible (see
Remark 6). Indeed, if (10) failed because  (y)  0 and  (y) < 0 for some
y 2 L2, then (x; y) = (y+; y ) impede (0; 0) to be a solution of (26). 
Corollary 10 has a parallelresult in the new framework.
Corollary 15 (;) is compatible if and only if z 2 .
Proof. If (;) is compatible then Corollary 14f implies that z 2 . Con-
versely, if z 2  then the proof of the implication f) ) a) in Corollary 14
applies again. 
Remark 16 Corollary 14 shows that the lack of compatibility often holds. For
instance, if  is the CV aR then every element in  is essentially bounded (see
(21)), and therefore  will not be compatible with any pricing model whose SDF
is unbounded (Black and Scholes, stochastic volatility models in continuous time,
etc.). This result was already pointed out by Balbás et al. (2016a) and others
with di¤erent proofs. With a similar argument one can show that the weighted
CV aR (Rockafellar et al., 2006) and the robust CV aR (Balbás et al., 2016b) are
often non compatible with the usual continuous time pricing models of nancial
economics. 
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Next let us show that ~N (;) may be understood as a minimum relative
(per dollar) price modicationpreventing the existence of GD. In order words,
let us give a result similar to Corollary 11.
Corollary 17 Consider a solution (; ; z) of (27), suppose that IP (z > 0) =
1, and take  (y) = IE (yz) for every y 2 L2. Then;
a)  (1) = 1, and the riskless rate remains the same if  replaces .
b) ~N (;) = 0. Thus, if replaces  then (;) is compatible.
c)
~N (;)  Sup f (x)  (y) ; x; y  0;  (x) =  (y) = 1g ; (29)
and the equality holds if (26) is solvable.5 In particular,  =  if and only if
(;) is compatible.
d) If z 2 L2, IE (z) = 1, IP (z > 0) = 1,  (y) = IE (yz) for
every y 2 L2, there are no solutions of (27) whose third component is z,
and ~N (;) = 0 , then
~N (;)  Sup f (x)  (y) ; x; y  0;  (x) =  (y) = 1g : (30)
Proof. a) It trivially follows from (3).
b) If z replaces z in (27) then it is obvious that ( = 0;  = 1; z) becomes
(27)-feasible, and therefore ~N (;) = 0.
c) As in the proof of Corollary 14, if ~N (;) = 0 then z = z, and
therefore  =  and the right hand side of (29) equals zero too. Suppose that
~N (;) > 0. Take x; y  0 with  (x) =  (y) = 1. The constraints of (27)
imply that
    = (   ) IE (zy)  IE (zy)  IE (zy) ;
(   ) IE (zx)  IE (zx)  IE (zx) = :
Consequently,
IE (zx)  IE (zy)     (   ) =  = ~N (;) :
Moreover, if (x; y) solves (26), the second, third, fourth and fth equalities in
(28) lead to (recall that  > 0)
    = (   ) IE (zy) = IE (zy) ;
IE (zx) = IE (zx) = :
Thus, IE (zx)  IE (zy) =    (   ) =  = ~N (;) :
d) Suppose that (; ; z) is never (27)-feasible for 0     1 and   1.
Then, for every   1 the inequality z  z will not hold, because if it held
then  =  would make ( = ; ; z) (27)-feasible. Thus, for every   1 there
5We will see that (26) is not necessarily solvable, i:e:, it does not necessarily attain its op-
timal value. This is a di¤erence between Problems (12) and (26) (Proposition 7 and Theorem
19).
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exists x  0 in L2 such that IE (zx) > IE (zx). Moreover, IE (zx) > 0
due to (24). Replacing x with x= IE (zx) if necessary, and still denoting x,
one can suppose that IE (zx) = 1 and IE (zx) > . Taking y = 1 (riskless
security) we have
IE (zx)  IE (zy)    1;
which tends to +1 as so does . Hence, the right hand side of (30) is unbounded
and (30) becomes obvious.
Suppose that (; ; z) is (27)-feasible for some 0       1 and   1.
Take
 = Inf f  1; z  zg ; (31)
and it is obvious that
z  z: (32)
If  = 1 then (32) implies that z  z, and (3) and (25) will imply that
z = z. Whence, ( = 0;  = 1; z = z) will solve (27), against the
assumptions. Thus,
 > 1: (33)
Take
 = Inf f; 0       1; (   ) z  zg : (34)
The set above is non void because it obviously contains  = . Furthermore,
0       1
and
(   ) z  z (35)
obviously hold. Suppose that     = 1. Then, (35) implies that z  z,
and (3) and (25) imply that z = z. Once again we get a contradiction
because ( = 0;  = 1; z = z) will solve (27), and therefore
0      < 1: (36)
Bearing in mind (33) and (36), we can take " > 0 such that
0     (   ") < 1;    " > 1:
(31) and (34) lead to the existence of x"; y"  0 in L2 such that IE (zx") >
(   ") IE (zx") and IE (zy") < (   (   ")) IE (zy"). Therefore, nor-
malizing so that  (x") =  (y") = 1, and still denoting x" and y",
IE (zx")  IE (zy") > (   ") IE (zx")  (   (   ")) IE (zy")
= (   ")  (   (   ")) =    2":
Moreover, since (32), (33), (35) and (36) make (; ; z) (27)-feasible,  
 must hold, and therefore IE (zx")  IE (zy") >    2" = ~N (;)  2". If
" converges to zero we will have (30). 
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Remark 18 As in Remark 12, one can use the latter corollary so as to recover
fair prices. Indeed, if replaces  then compatibility will hold, the over-
priced marketed claims, characterized by
 (y) = IE (yz) = (   ) IE (yz) = (   )  (y)
(see (28)) will recover a fair price once the initial one  (y) is multiplied by
   , and the under-priced marketed claims, characterized by
 (x) = IE (xz) = IE (xz) =  (x)
will recover a fair priceonce the initial one  (x) is multiplied by .
3.4 Lack of compatibility between the CVaR and the Black
and Scholes model or other continuous time pricing
processes
Bearing in mind Remark 16, it may be interesting to give the value of ~N (;)
for some important risk measures and pricing models. This is the purpose of
this section. Along with Assumptions 1 and 3, in this section we will also impose
Assumption 4 below;
Assumption 4 There does not exists any (; z) 2 IR such that  > 0
and IP (z  z) = 1. 
Assumption 4 frequently holds in practice. For instance, it holds if z is not
essentially bounded (Black and Scholes, stochastic volatility, etc.) and  is
composed of essentially bounded random variables (CV aR; and very often the
RCV aR and the weighted CV aR, see (20) and (21)). Besides, Assumption 4
enables us to simplify Problem (27).
Theorem 19 a) (;) is not compatible.
b) Consider Problem
Min 

z  z
1  ; z 2  (37)
(; z) 2 IR L2 being the decision variable. Then, (; ; z) solves (27) if and
only if  =  and (; z) solves (37). Consequently, (37) is bounded and
solvable, and its optimal value equals ~N (;).
c) If (; z) solves (37) and IP (z > 0) = 1, then Problem (26) is not solv-
able, although it is bounded and its optimal value is ~N (;) > 0.
d) Suppose that  2 (0; 1), (; z) is (37)-feasible and  = CV aR. Then,
(; z) solves (37) if and only if
z (!) = Min

z (!) ;
1
1  

(38)
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out of a IP null set. Furthermore, IP (z > 0) = 1 and therefore Problem (26)
is not solvable.
e) Suppose that  2 (0; 1), (; z) 2 (1;1)  L2 and  = CV aR. Then,
(; z) solves (37) if and only if
IE (Min fz; 1= (1  )g) = 1 (39)
and (38) holds.
Proof. a) If (;) were compatible then Corollary 14 shows that (; ; z) =
(0; 1; z) would solve (27), and therefore it would be (27)-feasible. Thus, z 2
 should hold and  = 1 would contradict Assumption 4.
b) If (; ; z) is (27)-feasible, then Assumption 4 trivially implies that  = .
Then, the equivalence between Problems (27) and (37) becomes straightforward
and b) trivially follows from Theorem 13.
c) Take the solution (; ; z) of (27). Statement a) and Corollary 14 imply
that  > 1, and Assumption 4 and the constraints of (27) imply that   =
0. If (x; y) solved (26) then (28) would imply yz = 0, and IP (z > 0) = 1
would imply IP (y = 0) = 1. Notice that  =  > 1 and IP (y = 0) = 1
contradict the second condition of (28), so (26) cannot be solvable. The rest of
the proof trivially follows form Theorem 13.
d) Suppose that (; z) solves (37). z  z obviously must hold, and
z  1= (1  ) holds because z 2  (see (20) with dQdIP = 1). Hence,
z Min fz; 1= (1  )g : (40)
Suppose that (40) is not a equality. Then,
1 = IE (z) < IE (Min fz; 1= (1  )g) :
Consider " > 0 with   " > 1 (recall that  > 1 due to a) and Corollary 14e)
and IE (Min fz; 1= (1  )g)  " > 1. Obviously,
Min fz; 1= (1  )g  Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g
 z   (   ") z = "z:
Thus, bearing in mind (25),
IE (Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g)  IE (Min fz; 1= (1  )g)  " > 1: (41)
Since IP ((   ") z > 0) = 1 due to (24),
IP (Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g > 0) = 1
becomes obvious, and IP (Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g  1= (1  )) = 1 is ob-
vious too. Thus, (41) leads to
Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g
IE (Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g) 2 ;
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and
Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g
IE (Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g)  (
   ") z
implies that 
   "; Min f(
   ") z; 1= (1  )g
IE (Min f(   ") z; 1= (1  )g)

is (37)-feasible. We have a contradiction because (; z) solves (37). Hence
(40) is an equality, and (38) holds.
Conversely, if (38) holds and (; z) does not solve (37) then the solution
(; z) of (37) satises  < , and the proved implication leads to
z = Min fz; 1= (1  )g : (42)
Bearing in mind (3), we have the chain
1 = IE (z) = IE (Min fz; 1= (1  )g)
 IE (Min fz; 1= (1  )g)  IE (z) = 1
and therefore
Min fz; 1= (1  )g = Min fz; 1= (1  )g :
Hence,  <  and (24) imply that z  1= (1  ), and (42) leads to z =
1= (1  ). Therefore, IE (z) = 1= (1  ) > 1, and we have a contradiction with
(3).
e) If (38) and (39) hold then (; z) is (37)-feasible. Therefore, (; z)
solves (37) due to d).
Conversely, suppose that (; z) solves (37). Then, (38) follows from d).
Besides, z 2  implies that IE (z) = 1, so (38) leads to (39). 
Remark 20 Theorem 19 shows how di¤erent are going to be the given mea-
sures ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

of Section 3:1 and ~N (;) of Section 3:3. While
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

can take every non negative value, and the null value
will sometimes hold, ~N (;) will be almost always strictly positive (Theorem
19a) and strictly higher than 1 = 100% (Theorem 19b). In particular, for
 = CV aR, and bearing in mind Corollary 17 and Theorem 19d, if the pricing
rule is modied so as to prevent the existence of GD, the relative (per dollar)
price modication might be larger than 100% for some marketed claims. Oth-
erwise the existence of GD could remain true, though it is important to point
out that Corollary 17 just provide an upper bound, rather that the exact price
relative variation. Anyway, (30) justies that every substitution of z must be
implemented with a solution of (37) (see also Remark 22 below). 
Remark 21 Expressions (38) and (39) signicantly facilitate the practical com-
putation of

 = ~N (;) ; z

if  = CV aR. In real examples, and according
to 18d) and 18e), the key condition to estimate  is the equality
IE (Min fz; 1= (1  )g) = 1: (43)
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It seems to be clear that Monte Carlo simulation methods may be useful so as
to match (43), though we will not address any numerical experiment in order to
shorten the exposition. 
Remark 22 Let us focus on the Black and Scholes model. Without loss of gen-
erality, if one looks for a GD only composed of European style derivatives,6 then
one can simplify the structure of the probability space (
;F ; IP). Indeed, assume
that 
 = (0; 1) and IP is the Lebesgue measure on the Borel  algebra of this
set. The value at T of the underlying asset will have a log-normal distribution
which can be given by
S (!) = WExp

r   
2
2

T + 
p
T 1 (!)

(44)
for ! 2 (0; 1), W > 0 denoting the current price, and r and  denoting drift and
volatility. Obviously,  : IR 7 ! (0; 1) is the cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal distribution.
This simplication cannot be implemented when pricing path dependent or
American style derivatives. In both situations the dynamic evolution of the
GBM plays a critical role. Thus, when we choose the simple probability space
(
;F ; IP) above we know that we are missing information. However, our sim-
plication is interesting because the exposition is shortened, it becomes much
easier, and it provides closed formulas for z. We will still obtain solutions of
(26) and (27) that will allow the investor to create the sequences of Proposition
1 or satisfying (9). The only restriction is that our sequences will be composed
of European style derivatives and might become sub-optimal if more complex
securities were involved.
It is known that z is also log-normal and it is the rst derivative of the one
to one strictly increasing function (Wang, 2000)
(0; 1) 3 ! $ g (!) =    +  1 (!) 2 (0; 1) ; (45)
where
 =
r

p
T : (46)
Computing the derivative in (45) we have that
z (!) = Exp

 
2
2
   1 (!)

(47)
! 2 (0; 1), which easily allows us to verify that (0; 1) 3 ! $ z (!) 2 IR is
continuous and strictly decreasing. Since is strictly decreasing and  > 1, the
computation of

 = ~N (;) ; z

simplies to the estimation of p 2 (0; 1)
such that (see (38), (39) and (43))
p
1   +
1
(1  ) z (p)
Z 1
p
z (!) d! = 1: (48)
6Remark 20 applies for more complex derivatives.
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In fact, if one solves (48) then
 =
1
(1  ) z (p) ; z
 (!) =
8><>:
1
1  ; !  p
z (!) ; !  p
In order to solve (48) one can change the variable ! =  (u  ) in the integral,
and straightforward manipulations lead to the new equation
p
1   +
1
(1  ) z (p)
      1 (p) = 1; (49)
which may be solved with numerical methods. If one solved (49) for the para-
meters used in Section 3:2, i:e:,  = 89:5%, r = 1%,  = 60%, T = 1=4 and
(see (46))  = 0:007900634, the result would satisfy  > 1. In Section 3:2
we obtained ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

 0:42%. With the same drift, volatility,
expiration date, pricing model and risk measure we can obtain ~N (;) =  >
100% > 0:42%. Obviously, the GD size increases because now we are consider-
ing every y 2 L2 as a reachable pay-o¤, and in Section 3:2 we only dealt with
nitely many options. The GD size increases as so does the set of available
securities. Nevertheless, the di¤erence
100%  0:42% = 99:58%
is really relevant. According to Corollaries 11 and 17, the minimum relative
price modication preventing the GD existence might signicantly increase as
the number of available options tends to innity, though it is important to point
out that Corollary 17 just provide an upper bound, rather that the exact price
relative variation. Anyway, (30) and  > 100% justify that every substitution
of z must be implemented with a solution of (37) (see Remark 20 above). 
Remark 23 (Beyond the log-normal distribution) Though Remark 21 yields
a general enough estimation method, the simplication of Remark 22 may be
interesting when dealing with European style derivatives. In such a case (44) and
(47) are no strictly necessary, and the methodology may be extended beyond the
Black and Scholes model. Instead of (44), suppose that S1 is the random value at
T of a stochastic pricing process. Suppose that the model has been calibrated and
we have chosen a unique SDF z such that (23) applies. Suppose nally that
the cumulative distribution function F : (U; V )  ! (0; 1) of the random variable
S1 is a one to one continuous bijection for some  1  U < V  1.7 Then,
the simplication (44) may be adapted to this new framework, in the sense that
one can take
S1 (!) = F
 1 (!) ;
! being a uniform distribution on (0; 1). Moreover, z may be also understood
as a function (0; 1) 3 !  !z (!) 2 (0;1). This setting allows us to easily
extend the methodology of Remark 22. 
7This assumption is not at all restrictive. It holds for many continuous distributions
(exponential, normal, log-normal, Gamma, Pareto, etc) used in Financial Economics.
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4 Some actuarial and nancial implications
Many classical problems in nance and insurance deal with risk optimization.
This section will be devoted to illustrating how classical problems may become
unbounded if one faces lack of compatibility. As a consequence, one must recover
compatibility before making decisions. Otherwise the problem solution will not
make economic sense or lead to wrong decisions.
We will select a few actuarial and nancial problems. This is not at all an
exhaustive collection of potential applications, but the purpose of this section
is just illustrative; One must prevent the existence of GD. Furthermore, for
the same reason, we will not present global solutions of the proposed problems,
which would require a signicantly larger paper.
4.1 Actuarial examples
Let us focus on a couple of actuarial classical topics. The rst one is the optimal
reinsurance problem. Since Borch (1960) and Arrow (1963) proved that, under
adequate assumptions, the stop-loss contract minimizes the standard deviation
of the ceding company nal wealth, this problem has been once and once again
revisited by many authors. The most recent approaches deal with general risk
measures rather than the standard deviation (see, amongst many others, Zhuang
et al., 2016, Weng and Zhuang, 2016, etc.), and sometimes also incorporate the
e¤ect of the nancial market (Guan and Liang, 2014, Peng and Wang, 2016,
etc.). Let us point out how the incorporation of the nancial market e¤ect may
lead to non well-posed optimization problems.
Under the notations of Sections 2 and 3 let us consider that the random
variable u0 2 L2 represents the indemnications to be paid by a insurer within
the time period [0; T ]. Decompose u0 = ur + uc, ur; uc 2 L2 denoting the
retained and ceded risk after a reinsurance contract. If y 2 Y is the pay-o¤
provided by the nancial market, the insurer nal wealth will equal y   ur.
Thus, if C > 0 represents the capital to diversify between the nancial market
and the reinsurance contract, the optimal reinsurance problem may become
Min  (y   ur)
8<:  (y) + (1 +K) IE (u0   ur)  C0  ur  u
y 2 Y; ur 2M
(50)
(y; ur) being the decision variable, K > 0 denoting the loading rate and M
denoting the set of risks z 2 L2 such that z and u0   z are co-monotone with
u0.8 The objective function of (50) implies that the reinsurer prices according to
the expected value premium principle. This assumption may be signicantly
relaxed and the rest of the example will remain true, but we will present an
example as simple as possible because we only have illustrative purposes.
8Recall that u0 and u1 are co-monotone if
IP ((u0 (!1)  u0 (!2)) ((u1 (!1)  u2 (!2)))  0) = 1:
25
Proposition 24 If there is a GD then Problem (50) is unbounded, i:e:, there
are sequences of feasible decisions whose risk diverges to  1.
Proof. Consider the sequence (yn)
1
n=1  Y satisfying (9), and take (yn   1)1n=1 
Y and ur = u0 2M. Then (yn   1; ur) is feasible because
 (yn   1) + (1 +K) IE (u0   ur) = 0  C:
Moreover, Assumption 1 implies that
Limn!1 (yn   1  ur)   ( 1  ur) + Limn!1 (yn) =  1;
and Problem (50) is unbounded. 
Proposition 24 above shows that very important classical actuarial problems
do not make sense under the presence of GD. Actually, the provided proof only
indicates that the insurer must retain the global actuarial risk because it will
be compensated in the nancial market.9
From a theoretical viewpoint, optimal reinsurance approaches involving both
actuarial risk and asset pricing models must deal with GD free models. Oth-
erwise the solution will not exist or will not make sense. A potential solution
overcoming this caveat could be to recover the GD absence by modifying the
pricing rule according to the lines of Corollary 17.
Approaches involving both actuarial risk and static nancial strategies cre-
ated with real market quotations should also verify the fulllment of the equality
~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

= 0. If it does not hold, then some additional restriction
should be incorporated to the y variable of (50) in order to prevent unbounded
solutions. For instance, one could consider an upper bound to the short position
value, in the line of the constraint imposed in (12). Once these additional re-
strictions have been incorporated, the existence of GD will have positive e¤ects
on the reached risk level, in the sense that the minimum value of the objective
 (y   ur) will decrease. The global fall of  (y   ur) will be closely related to
the value of ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

.
As a second actuarial example, suppose that a insurer is computing the
loading rate K that a set of policies must pay. Denoting by (ui)
N
i=1  L2 the
random indemnications associated to the involved policies, the global portfolio
premium will become (1 +K)
PN
i=1 IE (ui). If this money in invested in the
nancial market, and y 2 Y is the random reached pay-o¤, the nal insurer
wealth will become y  PNi=1 ui. Thus, the insurer problem may become
Min K
8><>:
 (y)  (1 +K)PNi=1 IE (ui)  0


y  PNi=1 ui  0
y 2 Y; K 2 IR
(51)
9Notice that the independence between the nancial market and the global indemnication
did not have to be imposed.
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(K; y) being the decision variable. As in Proposition 24, and bearing in mind
Proposition 1, if (;) is non compatible it is easy to see that (51) is unbounded,
i:e:, there are sequences of feasible solutions provoking that K diverges to  1.
Hence, the comments about the optimal reinsurance problem apply again. The
insurer may modify the pricing rule if a pricing model is used, or he/she must
incorporate bounds in the short position value when dealing with real market
quotations.
4.2 Financial Examples
Since Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) gave a simple procedure to minimize the
CV aR, many studies in portfolio choice and asset allocation have extended the
classical approach of Markowitz once the standard deviation was replaced by an
alternative risk measure or robust risk measure (V aR, CV aR, RCV aR, etc.).
Amongst many others, interesting examples are Stoyanov et al. (2007), Haugh
and Lo (2001), Dupacová and Kopa (2014), Balbás et al. (2016b), Zhao and Xiao
(2016), etc. Expression (9) shows that the GD existence implies the availability
of sequences of investment strategies whose expected return diverges to +1
while their risk diverges to  1. Once again we will be facing unbounded prob-
lems and theoretical results without economic sense. In Balbás et al. (2016b)
the authors propose to enlarge the ambiguity level of the investor. Alternatively,
for non ambiguous agents one could deal with the ideas of this paper. Corol-
laries 11 and 17 propose ways to modify the pricing rules, while Problems (12)
and (26) propose solutions making the problems bounded. Anyway, according
to the empirical analysis yielded by Balbás et al. (2016a), the intuition is that
high values of ~N

; (Sj)
m
j=0 ; (pj)
m
j=0

or ~N (;) will imply that the investor
might be able to create strategies with a very attractive return=risk ratio.
Many more classical nancial problems may be treated with risk measures.
For instance, pricing and hedging issues (Goovaerts and Laeven, 2008, Balbás
et al., 2010), risk management (Ahn et al., 1999, Constantinides et al., 2011),
regulatory capital etc. All of them will often lead to unrealistic solutions in the
presence of GD, which implies that the pricing rules will have to be changed. If
there are no pricing processes involved, and only market quotations are being
considered, appropriate bounds must be imposed. Both, constraints in the line
of Problems (12) and (12), and constraints related to the limit order book will
have to be considered. It may be important to point out that the additional
constraints of Problems (12) and (12) will be quite similar to those related to
the restrictions of the limit order book.
5 Conclusion
The existence of GD is anti-intuitive and should not make any economic sense,
but it often holds in practice. The GD size has been measured for both real
market quotations and theoretical pricing models. In both cases the provided
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measure has optimized the strategy risk with respect to the value of the sold
assets, which means that we are measuring in monetary and relative terms.
If only real market quotations are involved and the risk measure is robust
then the approach is also model-independent. In this case the GD measure has
a dual interpretation in terms of the minimum relative (per dollar) price mod-
ication preventing the GD existence. Moreover, it yields information about
which are the over-priced and the under-priced securities. Numerical examples
have been studied.
If a pricing model is involved then the dual interpretation above still applies,
as well as the comments about over or under priced pay-o¤s, but there are also
very important di¤erences with respect to the model-independent case. Firstly,
if the SDF is not essentially bounded then GD existence will always hold if the
risk measure sub-gradient is composed of essentially bounded random variables.
Secondly, the GD size will be much higher. Actually, it will be higher than
100%, while this value is quite di¢ cult to reach with a nite collection of real
market data. Explicit expressions of the GD size have been given for the Black
and Scholes model.
Lastly, it is important to remark that theGD existence may provoke patholo-
gies in many classical actuarial and nancial problems. Concrete examples have
been provided. The developed methodology allows the agent to overcome these
pathologies and prevent wrong decisions.
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